Elections 2006: By A Nose
In many ways, Vicente Fox was a disappointment to Mexican voters. During the electoral campaign he had portrayed himself as a successful business leader poised to bring modern business practices into his administration. It is a common problem, where CEOs are seen as more decisive than politicians, and able to get things done. The problem is that CEOs are used to the boardroom, where new initiatives are discussed, the CEO decides on a plan of action, and his staff gets with the program or they are out the door. Unfortunately for Fox, the straightforward approach doesn’t work in politics where the leader has to contend with an unruly congress, interest groups, and competing forces within his own party. Fox did not prove able to manage effectively this new environment. Furthermore, Fox consciously tried to make a break with past dictatorial political practices, not wishing to govern by decree or fiat. Ironically, he was seen as a weak leader, and Mexican presidents are expected to get things done, not blame failure on a recalcitrant congress. In short, the PAN suffered at the polls during Fox’s final years in office.
In 2006, the PAN’s presidential candidate, Felipe Calderón, began the electoral campaign well behind the PRD’s charismatic Andres Manuel López Obrador (AMLO). In March it appeared that AMLO would win comfortably, but in April Calderón slowly began to build and consolidate his support, eroding AMLO’s lead. An IFE official remarked to the authors at this time that his organization was concerned that, among the many possible outcomes of the elections, AMLO could lose by a very small margin. Under this then-theoretical scenario, he was certain AMLO would challenge the results in a forceful manner, throwing the credibility of IFE into question – the official believed that, should any other candidate lose by a close margin, the result would be accepted. This official’s concern was prophetic.
AMLO had made a strong reputation for himself as Head of Government (Mayor) of Mexico City. He was seen as an honest and capable administrator, willing to challenge the federal government on social issues. He used this platform to launch his candidacy and his chances appeared solid (other PRD leaders had followed this route without success in the past, but AMLO had energy, perseverance, a flair for public speaking which touched the pulse of the poor, and charisma). He steamrollered the PRD’s leadership convention, as the only candidate with a chance to topple either of the two leading parties. Traditionally, support for the PRD had hovered around the 17% level, but AMLO had potential to raise this significantly. AMLO’s confrontational and dictatorial tactics at the convention lost him the support of the party hierarchy, but he thought he could win the presidency on the strength of his personal appeal. He also ignored potential allies from the left.
The June 2006 vote gave the PAN’s Calderón a win by less than one percent of the votes cast. As expected by our IFE official, AMLO screamed foul, and challenged the results. The PRD sought a recount of votes in 54% of the polls (basically all those where the PRD had lost and if a recount went against them, it would not matter). A recount was ordered in about 9.0% of voting stations, and the result was even closer. Although the margin had narrowed, the Electoral Court ruled that there was insufficient cause to annul the elections. The Supreme Court ratified this decision and Calderón was declared president by a margin of 0.54% of the popular vote (240,000 votes). AMLO, however, refused to accept the ruling. He proclaimed himself “legitimate president” and was inaugurated, along with a parallel government, in front of a crowd of several hundred thousand. His supporters declared “peaceful civil resistance” which included marching in the streets, blockading banks and government offices, and holding large public rallies that disturbed the day-to-day life of major cities. His followers in congress disrupted sessions and tried to block the inauguration of President Calderón. As late as 2008, AMLO supporters occupied Congress to block discussion on possible energy reforms.
Although AMLO’s protest movement slowly lost support, much damage had been done. In one poll in December 2006, 42% of those polled believed that Calderón’s victory had been achieved through fraud, and 46% that it was legitimate. Nonetheless, 74% of responses rejected civil resistance/disobedience, and 56% disapproved of AMLO taking the title of “legitimate president”. While divided over the legitimacy of the Calderón administration, Mexican’s were clearly uncomfortable with AMLO’s confrontational ways. His polarizing rhetoric also lost its impact over time. He was largely seen as a spent force and a polarizing figure in politics, out of tune with Mexico’s new politics, and Calderón was quickly adopted as Mexico’s “legitimate President”.
Elections 2012: He’s Back!
AMLO is, once again, the PRD’s candidate for president. After a lacklustre performance in early days – when PRD support appeared to be stuck in the 16-17% range – AMLO’s campaign gained some momentum. While the PRI maintained a comfortable lead, the PAN’s campaign stagnated, and some of its support appears to have drifted to the PRD.
Feb 2012 March 2012 June 2012
Enriqu Peña Nieto (PRI) | 36% | 42% | 35-40% |
Andrés Manuel López Obrador (PRD) | 17% | 17% | 20-26% |
Josefina Vásquez Mota (PAN) | 29% | 24% | 20% |
Although he has moderated his discourse, as in 2006 AMLO lacks the support of the PRD’s leadership. Furthermore, the PRD machine in northern Mexico is weak, and AMLO has little presence there. The PAN was neither able to kick start its campaign in time to catch up to AMLO or overcome the negative aspects of Calderón’s presidency. The PRI retains the largest grassroots organization/presence of any party in Mexico and will get its voters to the polls. The polls, including exit polls suggest a return to power of the PRI by a comfortable margin – not another squeaker as in 2006. Should AMLO cry foul and take to the streets again, he is unlikely to receive the groundswell of support that he did in 2006.
Is a return to the PRI necessarily bad? We believe Mexico has undergone a fundamental political change since 1994, and a return to the old pseudo-democratic approach and dirty tricks would be a severe mistake for the PRI. Turning back the clock would be most difficult, if not impossible, and the PRI will have to operate under the new political rules. The PRI has, historically, been strongly anti-American, and used the USA as scapegoat for its own policy failures domestically. Whipping up xenophobia and anti-American feeling will no longer be easy, given the transparency of the internet age, nor will blaming the woes of Mexico on the USA.
There are questions, inter alia, about whether the PRI will continue the war on drugs initiated by Calderón, or whether it will gradually open Mexico’s energy sector to foreign investment. On the former, we suspect a return to a “live and let live” approach, which would give the cartels more room for manoeuvre, and the PRI more political energy for other priorities. On the latter, Mexico’s oil production is declining and its future lies in deep offshore fields. Foreign technology is required and if Mexico is to maintain its status as an oil exporter, the state oil corporation (PEMEX) has to be opened to the private sector – domestic or foreign. The PRI faces major policy challenges.
0 comments:
Post a Comment