Chile: Game Over for Concertación?

The Birth of Concertación

Chilean politics have been dominated by “Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia” since the late 1980s. This political alliance, originally composed of 17 political parties from the centre and legitimate left – referred to as “Concertación”, came together in 1988 with the objective of manoeuvring the Pinochet dictatorship into holding free and fair elections. It skilfully reduced Pinochet’s political space and forced elections in 1989. Its candidate, Patricio Aylwin Azocar, won handily with 55% of the popular vote, and Concertación dominated Chilean politics for the next 20 years. Based on the raison d’être that Pinochet could never be allowed to return to politics, Concertación was able to bridge – perhaps only temporarily – the traditional three-way split in Chilean politics (well-defined and entrenched one/third right, one/third centre, and one/third leftist) that had led to political instability. It became Chile’s bulwark against the possible return to military dicatorship.

Erosion of a Coalition

Over the next few years the far left splinter parties left the alliance and by the early1990s the 17 original parties were reduced to four, with the centrist Christian Democrats and leftist Socialist Party dominating the coalition. The defection of the far left is attributed to what was seen as a betrayal of leftist ideals and principles by what militants believed had become a centrist government. Never particularly willing to cooperate even with the Socialist Party, the far left went its own way, taking much of the militant left with it. Although marginal to Concertación’s electoral strength, the psychological effect of these defections was significant.

The Remaining Four: Christian Democratic Party (PDC) Socialist Party (PS) Party for Democracy (PPD) Social Democratic Radical Party (PRSD)

Concertación was able to play the Pinochet card effectively for a number of years (i.e: the democratic centre and left must remain united so that Pinochet can never return to power). Several unsuccessful attempts were made in the early 2000s to bring him to justice for human rights abuses. He was stripped of his parliamentary immunities in 2004, however, and charges laid in 2006. He died before proceedings could begin, and with his death this key rationale for maintaining Concertación fell by the wayside. 

In addition, the continuing strains of trying to maintain the cohesion of well-defined political parties of the centre and left, with clear, distinct and inflexible ideologies against the need for a platform that could appeal to a wide political spectrum, became exceedingly difficult. What did help was the fact that the coalition could continue to win elections, although the margins of victory were often thin.

President/Party	Years in Office	Popular Support
Patricio Aylwin Azocar/PDC	1990-1994	55%	Considered transitional President
Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle/PDC	1994-2000	58%
Ricardo Lagos Escobar/PS	2000-2006	51%	Runoff election
Michelle Bachelet Jena/PS	2006-2010	54%
Sabastien Piñera Echeñique/Alliance for Chile	2010	51.6%	Runoff election

A Battered Coalition

The 2009 elections saw the rightist coalition “Alliance for Chile” win a narrow victory in a runoff election. The new president, Sabastien Piñera, hailed from “Renovación Nacional” a moderate right wing party. His narrow win suggested that Chileans from the centre no longer hold the fear that the election of a rightist regime could lead to a return to military rule. In fact, during the Bachelet presidency, Piñera often pushed for enhanced social programs where the socialist president resisted. Concertación was also criticized in 2009 for choosing Eduardo Frei as its presidential candidate. The full coalition did not rally behind him, he was considered too conservative by the left, and he led a lacklustre campaign. Some analysts suggested that Concertación had lost touch with its base.

There appears to have been an informal agreement that the PDC and PS would alternate presidential candidacies. After the Lagos presidency, it was expected that the gifted and charismatic Solidad Alvear of the PDC would be anointed at the coalition’s primary, thus ensuring the alternation of power between the two parties. The PS may well have used Bachelet’s sudden surge in popularity to scupper Alvear’s candidacy. Two PS presidents in a row could well have reduced the ardour of PDC supporters for the coalition. In any event, the primary process appears to have created more friction than harmony.

The End of a Coalition?

Some have suggested that a new generation of leaders in needed to revitalize Concertación. This new wave of leaders does not appear to be emerging. In order to retain their base support, it is more likely that parties will accentuate their differences, since the moderate right has eroded the right-wing in the PDC and the Community Party to left wing of the PS. We would suggest that unless Concertación can win back the presidency in 2017, it will likely be relegated to the dust bin of history. Since Piñera has been managing well, remains popular, and the fear of the right has diminished, this will be a tall order. On the other hand should the coalition disband, neither the PDC nor the PS stand much chance of beating the combined right.

There is some suggestion that Michelle Bachelet might be willing to try for another term as president. Although she represents an older generation and is not seen as a “team player” with the PDC, she retains high approval ratings. Currently she appears to be the best gambit for extending the life of Concertación, and pragmatic politicians within the coalition will likely jump on the bandwagon. Nonetheless, this is likely just delaying the inevitable, and Chile will eventually fall back into a political system that reflects the pre-1976 one/third right, one/third centre, one/third left political orientation of the electorate. This means a return to three main parties/coalitions in competition for power, with the incumbent instabilities inherent in such a system.

The difference from the early 1970s, however, is that political platforms and positions are likely to be somewhat less rigid, and attempts by parties to reach a wider potential political base will mitigate against extremism.  In addition, the right has become more comfortable with Concertación. In 1989, with Concertación’s first electoral victory, many in the right believed that although Aylwin was a well-meaning and moderate politician, the “communists” (i.e: anyone left of centre) would quickly dominate, undermine and manipulate his administration, and the economic reforms instituted by Pinochet would be eroded or eliminated. Should that have happened, there is the distinct possibility that the military would have intervened in politics again. Aylwin and his successors took great pains, however, to maintain the economic model – as Aylwin’s pragmatic finance minister Alejandro Foxley stated to the author: “We will keep to this economic model because it works”. Even under socialist presidents, the economic model has not been eroded, although there has been more emphasis on social programs and justice. We thus expect the relationship between the major political parties to be much more cooperative, and much less suspicious than it was before the Pinochet period.