Mexico: Winning the War on Drugs?

Declaration of War

In December 2006, newly inaugurated president Felipe Calderón launched a major campaign to curb the power of Mexico’s drug cartels. In particular, he deployed the Mexican armed forces to the north and reinforced the federal police presence along the Mexico-USA border. After five years of sustained effort the record in mixed: Despite some success in arresting cartel members and disrupting their activities, Mexican and US efforts ultimately have failed to defeat the cartels or stem the flow of drugs into the USA.

Public Support in Wavering

The Mexican public is tired of violence with little perceived result. It has focussed on the death toll, now at over 37,000 drug-related killings since Calderón assumed power. The vast majority of these deaths are the result of inter-cartel and intra-cartel violence and struggles for power. Only a small percentage of the casualties are police, military, local government officials or innocent bystanders. In fact drug-related killings constitute less than half of Mexico’s homicides (Mexico’s homicide rate remains low by Latin American standards: approximately 10 per 100,000 inhabitants vs over 85 per 100,000 in Venezuela). Recent polls indicate that Mexicans see street crime/public insecurity as the major issue confronting the country, and 80% believe that the situation worsened over the preceding 12 months. Since common crime has not increased measurably, those citizens polled appear to link rising drug deaths with the overall very serious problem of public insecurity rather than treating them as separate issues.

In 2006, the public largely supported Calderón’s offensive against the cartels, partly due to an increase in domestic drug use (some value the Mexican market for illicit drugs at well over US$1.6 billion). By November 2010, more than 50% of those polled stated that they believed the war on drugs had failed. It is not clear, however, whether the public favours any alternative strategy.

Public Institutions Not Up To The Challenge

Calderón may have jumped the gun in 2006. The police, judiciary and prisons were not equipped to undertake this battle. Although new resources have been applied in these fields, reform has been painfully slow and institutions will not be up to the task for many years – certainly not before Caderón leaves office in 2012. Ideally, he should have reformed and strengthened public institutions before embarking on this effort, but he likely did not feel he had the luxury of time.

Mexico’s armed forces have played a key role in Calderón’s campaign, but the working relationship between the police and military has been poor. Military leaders also fear that their personnel will be tainted by drug money should they be involved in the campaign for extended periods. There is broad public support for the use of force to combat the cartels, and while public confidence in the military remains high, the same cannot be said for the police, judiciary, elected officials and political parties – also key players in the anti-drug program, and where corruption is rife.

Calderón has increasingly made the point that Mexico will not defeat the cartels until the USA does something major to decease its consumption rates. We agree that while there is demand there will be supply. Mexico also complains that the flow of illicit firearms from the USA exacerbates their problem – and indeed that police are often outgunned by the cartels. We see little evidence, however, that the USA is prepared to take major steps to address either of these key issues.

Will Government Stay the Course?

We believe Calderón will actively pursue the struggle against the cartels to the end of his term in office. While some progress will be made over the next year towards curbing the cartels, he will not be able to point to any turning point or major victory. In addition, his approval rating has been slowly declining - from 63% when he took office to 49% in March 2011. His National Action Party (PAN) has fallen behind its leading opposition, the Party of the Institutional Revolution (PRI), in the polls, and we are now approaching the lame duck period leading up to the 1 July 2012 federal elections. Calderón has little political space to do more, and the unclear results of his program thus far will be unhelpful to his party’s prospects in the 2012 election.. 

Should Calderón’s PAN retain power, in all likelihood the current anti-cartel campaign will be sustained. At this point, however, it appears unlikely that the PAN will win the presidency in 2011 – although that could change should the PAN field a strong and charismatic presidential candidate.  More likely, the PRI will regain the presidency. If that should happen – and especially should the party old guard emerge the victor - a new government may give lip service to an anti-cartel program, but is likely to decrease such efforts in the expectation that the cartels would limit their violence to their own kind. We would expect a return to the live-and-let-live approach of PRI governments prior to 2000. While the USA will not be pleased with a dilution of Mexico’s anti-drug effort, the PRI has used vitriolic anti-American rhetoric to its domestic political advantage in the past, and is likely to attempt to do so again. Also, if the PRI can separate drug violence from normal street crime in the public perception, public pressures – already weakening – to tackle the cartels may further decrease.

 

Drifting Towards a Narco-State?

In Latin American terms, Mexico has strong public institutions, major budgetary resources, solid infrastructure, a reasonably professional military, a strong and active media, sophisticated political class, and no active insurgencies. There is little or no evidence that the cartels have effectively infiltrated the upper levels of government, and in those cases where there has been evidence of such wrongdoing, action has been taken.

The cartels, like taxmen, are likely to be with us always, and some parts of Mexico’s interior and its frontier with the USA will remain lawless, regardless of which party gains power in 2012. Mexico is most unlikely to decline to the point that the viability of the state is at risk, or that the legitimacy of the central government is threatened. We don’t expect that the cartels will increase their power and reach, but will remain a powerful force in the Mexican security equation.