 |
| Secretary General of the OAS, José Miguel Insulza |
Democratic Clause and Charter
The Organization of American States (OAS) has been better at reinforcing success than in punishing offenders. The building of democratic practices and institutions generally proceeded smoothly during the 1990s, and states were rewarded by the OAS. Where democracy was threatened, however, the OAS foundered. In an attempt to both reinforce democratic practices and to introduce a measure of censure to those who backtracked, the April 2001 Summit of the Americas in Quebec City adopted a democratic clause that excluded offenders from participating in the Summit of the Americas process. The OAS quickly followed by the passing of the Inter-American Democratic Charter at its General Assembly in Lima Peru on September 11, 2001.
States agreed that where the government of a member state considered “that its democratic political institutional process or its legitimate exercise of power is at risk, it may request assistance…for the strengthening and preservation of its democratic system.” The ultimate sanction was, “…an unconstitutional interruption of the democratic order or an unconstitutional alteration of the constitutional regime that severely impairs the democratic order in a member state, constitutes, while it persists, an insurmountable obstacle to the government’s participation in sessions of the General Assembly, the Meeting of Consultation, the Councils of the Organization, the specialized conferences, the commissions, working groups, and other bodies of the Organization.” Less drastic measures included sending fact finding missions, providing good offices and other support.
Does the Clause/Charter Work?
While the USA, Canada and the Commonwealth Caribbean have supported OAS intervention where democracy is threatened, the Latin American tradition and mantra has been to eschew outside interference in the domestic affairs of a member state. Since the OAS acts through consensus, after much negotiation, a democratic charter was adopted, but with the stipulation that member governments must invite the OAS to intervene in a crisis. Can the hemisphere be considered better protected now, since a government that feels under threat from non-democratic forces can appeal to the OAS? In fact, member states have long been able to appeal to the OAS for support in such cases.
 |
| OAS permanent council meeting |
Does the Clause/Charter Work?
While the USA, Canada and the Commonwealth Caribbean have supported OAS intervention where democracy is threatened, the Latin American tradition and mantra has been to eschew outside interference in the domestic affairs of a member state. Since the OAS acts through consensus, after much negotiation, a democratic charter was adopted, but with the stipulation that member governments must invite the OAS to intervene in a crisis. Can the hemisphere be considered better protected now, since a government that feels under threat from non-democratic forces can appeal to the OAS? In fact, member states have long been able to appeal to the OAS for support in such cases.
A serious loophole emerges when democratically elected leaders begin to take undemocratic action. Since OAS intervention can only be at the behest of the member government, it is unlikely that a leader intent on manipulating the system to ensure his position in power will seek OAS intervention, unless his actions have brought the wrath of the people upon his head. In fact, a former head of the OAS Unit for the Promotion of Democracy essentially stated to me that if a democratically elected leader acts in a dictatorial way, the electorate will have to put up with the situation until they can vote him out of office. If the subsequent election is faulty, then the OAS can intervene. This appears to me to be inadequate. There does not appear to be a mechanism whereby the people of a member state can appeal directly to the OAS to intervene when they believe they are being oppressed, albeit by a democratically elected government. The OAS record in such cases is mixed, and a large bloc within the OAS has resisted efforts to extend the powers of the organization to monitor individual country cases and intervene where necessary.
Peru 2000: A precedent
After the fraudulent re-election of Alberto Fujimori, in May 2000, bolstered by discussions at the Windsor Ontario General Assembly in June, the OAS developed a high-level dialogue/round table process, bringing together Peruvian opposition parties and civil society. This initiative filled an institutional vacuum and was instrumental in the transitional period leading up to free and fair elections in 2001. Fujimori ceded power, however, due to an untenable domestic situation rather than through international pressures. Nonetheless, the OAS can be applauded for its efforts to ensure a smooth transition from Fujimori. The Peruvian crisis clearly afforded a stimulus for adopting a democratic clause/charter.
Peru 2000: A precedent
After the fraudulent re-election of Alberto Fujimori, in May 2000, bolstered by discussions at the Windsor Ontario General Assembly in June, the OAS developed a high-level dialogue/round table process, bringing together Peruvian opposition parties and civil society. This initiative filled an institutional vacuum and was instrumental in the transitional period leading up to free and fair elections in 2001. Fujimori ceded power, however, due to an untenable domestic situation rather than through international pressures. Nonetheless, the OAS can be applauded for its efforts to ensure a smooth transition from Fujimori. The Peruvian crisis clearly afforded a stimulus for adopting a democratic clause/charter.
 |
| Anti-government rally in Ecuador |
Ecuador 2005: Not Unconstitutional
In April 2005, President Lucio Gutiérrez was in deep trouble. The presidential palace was under siege by mobs opposed to unpopular measures proposed by Gutiérrez. A hostile congress ruled that he had abandoned his office, and appointed Vice-President Alfredo Palacio as his successor. Gutiérrez appealed to the military for protection, but the latter informed him that they would not protect him. He fled to Brazil while seeking OAS intervention. While the OAS was quick to label this a coup d’etat, the process was constitutional, in that Congress has the power to dismiss a president on these somewhat spurious grounds. In Ecuador’s turbulent politics, presidents have little room for manoeuvre and elites will turn on them if they attempt to reform the system. The subsequent OAS observer mission was neither welcomed, nor its report essentially condemning the coup considered valid. Nonetheless, Palacios, however, was later recognized as president of Ecuador.
Honduras 2009: A Coup, or Not?
In June 2009, President Manuel Zelaya attempted to conduct a referendum to ascertain whether Honduran citizens would consider a major re-write of the Constitution. Honduras’ Congress, Supreme Court and Attorney General ruled that such a referendum would not be legal. The Honduran Army’s Judge Advocate General agreed. Zelaya persisted in his intent, and the Armed Forces Commander refused to distribute the ballot boxes – under the constitution the military must provide logistical support to any election. Zelaya fired his commander and declared that he and his followers would take charge of the ballots. The Supreme Court ordered Zelaya’s detention, and Congress appointed Roberto Micheletti (President of Congress and next in the order of succession) as interim president. The Armed Forces were ordered to arrest Zelaya, which they did. Up to this point, the constitutional process for replacing a president was adhered to, but the military (possibly on its own initiative) decided to send Zelaya into exile, which is against the constitution.
International condemnation was immediate. Honduras was suspended from the OAS, and both the OAS and UN condemned the “military coup” and demanded the restoration of Zelaya. The Secretary General of the OAS travelled to Honduras to negotiate Zelaya’s return. No government recognized Micheletti as interim president, and his promise to hold national elections in November was greeted with scepticism. Elections were held on schedule, with Porfirio Lobo assuming power in January 2009. Nonetheless, questions about the legitimacy of his mandate remained until after Lobo allowed Zelaya to return from exile. This is clearly a case where a democratically elected president was likely attempting to manipulate the political process to perpetuate him/herself in power, but the OAS membership tried to protect him.
Nicaragua: Systemic Abuse
Nicaragua’s national and municipal elections have long been considered irregular. The 2006 national elections were widely considered to be fraudulent, as were the 2008 municipal elections. The 2011 national elections were clearly deficient, and the congressional ruling that President Daniel Ortega could run for a third consecutive term appeared dubious. The OAS response to what has been a steady erosion of democratic institutions and practices in that country has neither been swift nor substantive.
 |
| President Daniel Ortega of Nicaragua |
Nicaragua: Systemic Abuse
Nicaragua’s national and municipal elections have long been considered irregular. The 2006 national elections were widely considered to be fraudulent, as were the 2008 municipal elections. The 2011 national elections were clearly deficient, and the congressional ruling that President Daniel Ortega could run for a third consecutive term appeared dubious. The OAS response to what has been a steady erosion of democratic institutions and practices in that country has neither been swift nor substantive.
Venezuela: More Systemic Abuse
After the attempted coup d’etat against President Hugo Chávez in April 2002, the OAS convoked a summit, but Chávez had already returned to power before leaders could meet. Subsequently, Chávez has placed limits on OAS electoral observer missions, disputed their findings and, in general, taken an antagonistic stance in that organization. Nonetheless, the response of the OAS has been mild in the light of a steady undermining of any opposition to Chávez and his regime.
 |
| President Barack Obama speaking to a crowd in Santiago, Chile |
Conclusion
While the Inter-American Charter has clarified some of the ground rules under which governments in the Americas can operate, it is not effective where a government refuses or declines to invite OAS intervention – and this remains one of the key challenge to democracy in the region. As a tool to effect positive change where democracy is threatened, the charter remains toothless. The current situation is akin to demanding that the police seek the permission of a criminal to investigate his/her possible misdeeds. In cases where the OAS has intervened (In Ecuador, but especially in Honduras) the result has been a ham-fisted, knee-jerk, rush to judgement – I think unusual for the OAS, and perhaps an indicator of how split the OAS on ideological lines.
There is little stomach in the Americas for further strengthening the Democratic Charter, but the OAS needs to be more assertive where democratic practices are systematically being undermined. Electoral observation may be one starting point. Where the OAS – invited to observe or not - finds instances of blatant and deep fraud which clearly affect the outcome of elections it should be able to invoke sanctions, to the point of suspending a member state, as was done in the case of Honduras. In the case of Honduras, economic sanctions were also discussed – there should be more of this type of discussion, and the consideration of other punitive action, including the termination of development assistance funding.
Photo credits:
Secretary Insulza: Noticias Caracas
OAS Permanent Council Meeting: OAS.org
Ecuador demonstration: Flag Identifier
President Daniel Ortega: Inquisitor
President Obama: HS News Network
There is little stomach in the Americas for further strengthening the Democratic Charter, but the OAS needs to be more assertive where democratic practices are systematically being undermined. Electoral observation may be one starting point. Where the OAS – invited to observe or not - finds instances of blatant and deep fraud which clearly affect the outcome of elections it should be able to invoke sanctions, to the point of suspending a member state, as was done in the case of Honduras. In the case of Honduras, economic sanctions were also discussed – there should be more of this type of discussion, and the consideration of other punitive action, including the termination of development assistance funding.
Photo credits:
Secretary Insulza: Noticias Caracas
OAS Permanent Council Meeting: OAS.org
Ecuador demonstration: Flag Identifier
President Daniel Ortega: Inquisitor
President Obama: HS News Network
0 comments:
Post a Comment