Nicaragua: The Tired Revolution

Sandino Vive

In July 1979, the dictatorship of Anastasio Somoza was overthrown through violent civil strife. The Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) had played a major role in defeating oppression. A five-person Junta of National Reconstruction was established, which the FSLN came to dominate. The FSLN offered land reform and the redistribution of wealth along with poverty alleviation and literacy programs.  In 1985, the FSLN won the national elections, its leader Daniel Ortega Saavedra, with 67% of the popular vote and a solid majority in congress.

Ortega’s move to the left, supported by the USSR and Cuba, alienated many voters from the centre and right, while polarized his potential international support. With its drift towards socialism, the establishment of a state/party-controlled neighbourhood control system, a blurring of lines between the party and state, and virulent anti-Americanism, Nicaragua appeared well on the way towards joining the Soviet camp.

The Decline of Ideology

The FSLN lost the next three national elections but remained a powerful force in opposition. While the party espoused a more moderate platform, it nurtured its militant grass-roots organization. As long as the opposition could remain largely united around one presidential candidate, the FSLN, with base support of between 35% and 40% was unlikely to regain the presidency. In the 2006 elections however, Ortega and the FSLN again won power, partly due to a “Pact” with the Constitutional Liberal Party to share power between the two leaders and parties. These elections were considered flawed, with fraud and intimidation of the opposition fairly widespread. Ortega received 38% of the vote and a minority position for the FSLN in Congress.

Since then, many of the FSLN’s long-term supporters and ideologues have left the party, disgusted by high levels of corruption within the party elite, Ortega’s intolerance towards criticism, and the erosion of political principles and ideals. Many bemoaned what they saw as the betrayal of the Sandinista revolution, and while a “purist” Sandinista party has been established, it has yet to make a political impact. Ortega has proven a better revolutionary than a leader in peacetime, interested largely in amassing power and personal gain. Intimidation of political rivals proceeded apace, and the judicial and electoral authorities, under the thumb of the FSLN, were used to restrict the ability of the opposition the field candidates, run effective campaigns or monitor the voting and counting processes. Gangs of thugs have been used for many years to forcibly break up opposition rallies while the police have largely stood by as passive observers. This pattern continued in 2008 during the municipal elections, which were considered by most international observers to be fraudulent. Several donors reduced or suspended development assistance programs as a result. While the opposition complained and marched in protest in the streets, it was not able to sustain such campaigns indefinitely, while the FSLN machine has been able to draw upon the resources of the state and foreign friends to maintain its national network.

Nicaragua’s previous constitutions prohibited consecutive election to the presidency. In October 2009, the FSLN-dominated Supreme Court approved consecutive re-election, setting the stage for Ortega to run for president in 2011. Notwithstanding, polls suggested that Ortega’s approval rating remained at about 45% in October, and that an FSLN win in 2011 was more than likely. Despite its critics, the FSLN has been able to draw upon extensive Venezuelan funding (possibly up to US$ 500 million/year) for social programs, which has more than offset the reduction in aid flows from OECD members. While accountability of these funds is murky, and much may be finding its way into private bank accounts, this sum represents 7% to 8% of Nicaragua’s GDP and its selective application, particularly in poor rural areas, has helped to retain the loyalty of the FSLN’s base and expand the number of adherents. Some figures suggest poverty has been reduced nationally from 65.5% in 2005 to 57% in 2011. Even if this is a somewhat inflated figure, it is a major accomplishment.

2011 National Elections:  More of the Same

Every indication is that the FSLN drew on its extensive box of dirty tricks to ensure a favourable electoral result. With high popularity ratings, however, why manipulate the electoral process in such a blatant way? Ortega, with a 45% approval level, would more than likely win the presidency fairly. Ortega, nonetheless, may well have felt the need for an insurance policy. As one of the FSLN’s last remaining founders, Tomas Borge, suggested recently, the party should never give up power, even if voted out.

On a deeper level, should Ortega wish to transform Nicaragua fundamentally through the application of Venezuelan-inspired 21^st Century Socialism, he would require a controllable majority in Congress. Others suggest he may wish to change the constitution to permit unlimited consecutive re-election, thus setting himself up as president for life. To do either of these things he would need to control well over 50% of congressional seats.

The formal results of the November 2011 elections suggest that Ortega has achieved his goals. With 64% of the vote, he can claim personal legitimacy and a mandate for change. The FSLN has also achieved a comfortable majority in Congress. While the opposition has protested and demonstrated in the streets, it is unlikely that such action can be sustained over more than a few months. With control over the political apparatus, the armed forces, police, judiciary and electoral branches, Ortega has the power to implement sweeping political change, and five years to do it.

It remains to be seen, however, whether any changes that Ortega may make will be superficial or deep. Ortega, himself, appears less of an ideologue and more of an authoritarian figure cloaked in socialist rhetoric. We would suggest that the process of consolidating total power over Nicaraguan political space, economy and institutions will continue. We would not rule out a move to enshrine indefinite consecutive election to the presidency. Further restrictions on freedom of expression or assembly are quite likely, particularly when elections approach – Ortega will not forget 1990, when the opposition – both left and right – rallied behind Violeta Chamorro and ousted him from power. He will not let this happen again. We predict a tough five years ahead for Nicaragua and its people.

If Ortega wishes to continue to receive Venezuelan largesse for his social programs – and perhaps personal enrichment – he will at least have to continue to mouth the language of 21^stCentury Socialism. We expect Ortega to continue to support Venezuela’s contentious positions in international fora, especially the OAS. Strong doses of anti-American and pro-Iranian rhetoric can be expected in lock step with other members of the Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas (ALBA). Any implementation of 21^st Century Socialism (which appears to be little more than 20^thCentury Communism) by Ortega is likely to be reluctant, slow and piecemeal, but he will mouth the jargon. Ortega’s attempts to introduce socialism/communism in the 1980s met with failure. Even with Venezuelan money, a fundamental restructuring of the Nicaraguan economy and society on such ideological lines is also likely to be meet fierce opposition and eventually failure. While communism may have been seen as a viable option to capitalism in some circles in the 1980s, its failures as a system are by now well documented, and there is little to suggest that Nicaragua could make a success of it where all others have failed.